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CASE COMMENTS

the service of a dependent servant, based on a psuedo-family relationship, no longer exists.2 3 The necessary shift in the function of the
action is to the protection of the employer's business interests, and

the cases indicate that the law has moved in that direction.
John Campbell Palmer IV

Pleading-Amendment of Pleadings by Leave of Court
The prior practice of "gamesmanship" in pleading has been replaced by a judicious emphasis on substance rather than on form
under the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules focus
on the orderly presentation of all the relevant issues.' Under the
Rules, substantive law need no longer seem to be "secreted in the
interstices of procedure." 2 Unfortunately, lawyers, and even judges
are often too busy with the business of the day to lay aside the
habits of decades. Perhaps, more for this reason than any other, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals gave a restrictive treatment
to Rule 15(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure in
deciding the case of Perdue v. S. J. Groves and Sons Co.' The
pertinent facts of that case are as follows:
Plaintiffs, who were landowners in Huntington, West Virginia,
alleged their home was damaged as the proximate result of depossibility of his servant injuring a third party. Conversely, when the servant
is injured by a third party, it is difficult to find that the tortfeasor should
foresee an injury to a person with whom the servant has merely a contractual relation. This is subject to the criticism that a tortfeasor should be
held to foresee such an injury since most people are employed; however,
courts usually hold that this is too remote. Another rationale commonly
employed is that the employer usually is the one who is best equipped to
bear the loss, whether his servant injures a third person or a third person
injures his servant. Thus while the two doctrines may be symmetrical factually, the rules of the courts result in the balance being weighted unequally.
23 City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 1,
5, 10 A.2d 434, 436 (1940). See Note, The Action Per Quod Servitium
Amisit, 26 AUSTL. L. J.122 (1952). See also United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 153 F.2d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 1946), aff'd 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (the
modem relationship of employer-employee is basically one of contract).
IThe Rules contemplate that a decision will be made on the merits
of the controversy. Morever, Rule 1 provides that the Rules "shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of any
action." W. VA. R. Civ. P. 1.
2 "So great is the ascendency of the Law of Actions in the infancy of
Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually
secreted in the interstices of procedure." Sm HENRY MAINE, EARLY LAW AND
CUSTOM 389 (1907).
3161

S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 1968).
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fendant's work on a highway construction project. Prior to trial,
but after defendant had answered, plaintiffs made a motion pursuant
to Rule 15(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure to
amend their complaint to contain allegations of additional damages.
The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion and later granted a defense
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs then appealed to the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, alleging in part that the
trial judge erred in refusing to grant plaintiffs' motion to amend
their complaint. Held, the trial court did not err on the basis that
the Rules of Civil Procedure substantially recognize the pre-existing
law of West Virginia relating to the amendment of pleadings and the
sound discretion of the trial judge in refusing or granting leave to
amend. The court stated, in conclusion, that plaintiffs' motion disclosed no basis for amendment. Perdue v. S. J. Groves and Sons Co.,
161 S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 1968).

Rule 15(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that once a responsive pleading has been filed a party
may amend his plea only by leave of court or with the written consent of his adversary. Moreover, Rule 15(a) provides such leave
shall be freely given when justice requires.4 Because the West Virginia Rule on amended and supplemental pleadings is identical with
the Federal Rule, the West Virginia court's interpretation of this
rule in the Perdue case may be profitably compared with the treatment given Rule 15(a) by the federal judiciary.5
A perusal of the federal decisions on the subject reveals a strong
liberality in allowing amendments under Rule 15(a).1 The federal
4 "A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which
no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it any any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an
amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original
pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever
period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders." W. VA. R. Civ.
P. 15(a).
5 "Another useful source will be interpretations of the Federal Rules
. Yet interpretations of the Federal Rules should be considered in the
context of federal jurisdiction and practice as a whole . . ... Silverstein, A
Basic Introduction to the New West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure,

62 W.6 VA. L. Rnv. 117, 134 (1959). Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

E.g., Dombrovski v. Murff, 24 F.R.D. 302, 304 (1959). It is clear
that the principal reason for allowing amendments so liberally is to facilitate
a disposition of cases on the merits. F. JIm.s, CivIL PRocEDuRE § 5.2 (1965).
For a discussion of the liberality with which the federal courts have allowed
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courts have uniformly held that amendments should be freely
granted under this rule.7 The cases make it evident that Rule 15(a)
declares an affirmative doctrine.' For example, the United States
Supreme Court stated in Foman v. Davis that, in the absence of any
apparent or declared reason to the contrary, an amendment offered
under Rule 15 (a) should be allowed.9 Justice Goldberg, speaking for
the Court, recognized the discretionary power of the trial court,
but said, in effect, that a refusal to grant leave without justification
is an abuse of discretion. ' * In general, the federal courts are disinclined to deviate from the mandate of Rule 15(a)." The trend of
federal opinion points to a policy which views proposed amendments
in a light most favorable to the movant." These courts have uniformly placed the burden on the trial court and the opposing party
to support any denial of a motion to amend under Rule 15(a).3 This
view is in sharp contrast to the view of the West Virginia court
in the Perdile case.
The court there said in substance, that unless the movant can
show good reason why leave to amend should be granted, the trial
court may properly, in its discretion, refuse to allow the amendleave to amend, and many illustrative cases, see 3 J.MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrcE 15.08 (2d ed. 1968). See also IA W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACncE AND PROCEDURE § 447 at 746, 747 (C. Wright ed. 1960).
7In fact, it can be said with little qualification that there must be a
showing of undue prejudice to the opposing party before a motion pursuant
to Rule 15(a) will be denied. However, note that no satisfactory definition
of "undue prejudice" can be synthesized from the cases. See Shelley v.
The Maccabees, 26 F.R.D. 10 (D.C.N.Y. 1960). Bad faith and undue delay
have also received considerable attention in the federal courts. However,
these factors are usually secondary to the "prejudice" factor. For a general
discussion of "bad faith" and "delay" as factors affecting the trial judge's

discretion, see Donnici, The Amendment of Pleadings-A Study of the Operation of JudicialDiscretion in the Federal Courts, 37 S.CAL. L. Rav. 529, 535
(1964).
8
E.g., Lone Star Motor Import, Inc., v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d
69, 75 (5th Cir. 1961). This case states emphatically that Rule 15(a)
declares an affirmative policy.
9 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
10
Compare the following pertinent language with the decision in the
principal case. "Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend
is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant
the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an
exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent
with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Id.
I E.g., Dombrovskis v. Murff, 24 F.R.D. 302, 304 (1959).
12 1 A. W. BARRON & A. HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
447 at 746, 747 (C. Wright ed. 1960).
13E.g., Midwestern Developments, Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 319 F.2d 53
(10th Cir. 1963).
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ment.' 4 This is a restricted view of Rule 15(a). However, insight
into the court's adoption of this interpretation may be had by
examination of West Virginia case and statutory law prior to the
Rules.' 5 Such an examination leads to the conclusion that the
Perdue court was strongly guided by past practice.
The general rule in West Virginia, prior to 1960, relating to the
amendment of pleadings was less affirmative and more restrictive
than the present rule.' 6 The prior statute which embodied these
general rules provided a limitation on changing the cause of action
by amendment. The present Rule contains no such restriction.
Moreover, as compared with the prior statute, Rule 15(a) limits
the trial judge's discretion. The statute provided that an amendment
may be permitted if, in the court's opinion, substantial justice will be
promoted thereby.' The present Rule provides that "leave [to
amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires."' 8 The
emphatic difference between "may be" and "shall be" is one of
critical importance and seems to lie at the foundation of the West

Virginia court's restrictive interpretation of Rule 15(a) in Perdue
v. S. J. Groves and Sons Co.' 9

The consistency of the federal courts' interpretation of Rule 15 (a)
with the spirit of the Rules as a whole suggests that the West Virginia

Supreme Court of Appeals' contrary interpretation of its Rule 15(a)
'4 The Court stated that it was of the opinion that plaintiffs motion for
leave to file an amended complaint under Rule 15(a) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, disclosed "no basis for an amendment of the complaint and that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the motion."
Perdue v. S. J. Groves and Sons Co., 161 S.E.2d 250, 257 (W. Va. 1968)
(emphasis added).
'5 For a discussion of the law relating to the amendment of pleadings
prior to the adoption of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure and a
comparison of those Rules with the Federal Rules see Lugar, Common Law
Pleading Modified Versus the Federal Rules, 53 W. Va. L. REv. 27 (1950).
16 Id. W. VA. CODE ch. 56, art. 4, § 24 (Michie 1949). "The plaintiff
may of right amend his declaration or bill at any time before the appearance
of the defendant; and, notwithstanding such appearance, in any action, suit,
motion or other proceeding, the court, if in its opinion substantial justice
will be promoted thereby, may . . .permit any pleading to be amended ...
changing the form but not the cause of action . . .and the court may allow
any other amendment in matter of form or substance In any ... pleading ...
which may enable the plaintiff to sustain the action, suit, motion or proceedNote that
ing for the cause for which it was intended to be brought .......
the present statute, W. VA. CODE ch. 56, art. 4, § 24 (Michie 1966), is identical but has no application to actions which are within the scope of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
17 W. VA. CODE ch. 56, art. 4, § 24 (Michie 1949).
1 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (emphasis added).
'9 161 S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 1968).
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should be re-examined. While the West Virginia court in the Perdue
case requires the movant to disclose some basis for his proposed
amendment, the federal courts grant such leave freely and only deny
a motion to amend when certain conditions exist which would
make it unfair to allow the amendment."0
Joseph Robert Goodwin
Property-Implied Warranty of Fitness in the Sale
of a New House
Morton, who was in the business of building and selling new
houses, contracted to sell a completed house and lot to Humber.
The only warranty contained in the deed was the warranty of title.
No other warranties, written or oral, were connected with the sale.
Humber alleges that the house was not suitable for human habitation
because the fireplace and chimney were not properly constructed.
As a result of this defect, the house caught fire and partially burned
the first time a fire was lighted in the fireplace. Morton defended
on the ground that the doctrine of caveat emptor applied to all sales
of real estate. In the Court of Civil Appeals, Morton's motion for a
summary judgment was granted and Humber appealed. Held,
reversed and remanded. The caveat emptor rule as applied to new
houses is outdated and out of harmony with modern home buying
practices. Consequently, the builder-vendor (house-merchant) impliedly warrants that such house was constructed in a good workmanlike manner and was suitable for human habitation. Humber
v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
The doctrine of caveat emptor flourished during the nineteenth
century in an atmosphere of rugged individualism where emphasis
was placed on secure business transactions.' However, caveat emptor
was not used extensively in the sale of homes because the homebuyer often hired an architect for designing and planning and then
hired a contractor to build according to the plans.' If the home were
defective, the home-owner had a cause of action against either the
architect or the contractor.
2

OFor a full discussion of judicial discretion in the federal courts see
Donnici, The Amendment of Pleading-A Study of the Operation of Judicial
Discretion in the Federal Courts, 37 S. CAL. L. REV. 529 (1964).
1 Keeton, Rights of DisappointedPurchasers,32 TEx. L. Rnv. 1 (1953-4).
2 Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant
Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967).
- Id. at 837.
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